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INTRODUCTION	
	
This	week	scholars	and	students	of	Leiden	University	have	swarmed	to	many	
places,	in	the	Netherlands	and	abroad	to	deliver	Cleveringa	lectures.	Thank	you,	
Dr.	Rudolf	de	Jong,	director	of	this	wonderful	institute,	for	inviting	me	to	deliver	
this	lecture	here	tonight,	and	to	all	of	you,	distinguished	guests,	ladies	and	
gentlemen,	for	taking	the	time	to	attend	this	gathering.	Let	me	first	say	a	few	
words	about	the	man	we	commemorate	today,	Professor	Rudolph	Cleveringa.	
	
On	Tuesday	26	November	1940	at	10	o’	clock	in	the	morning	the	dean	of	the	
faculty	of	law,	Prof.	Cleveringa,	took	the	floor	of	Leiden	University’s	main	lecture	
hall.	A	few	days	before,	the	government	had	issued	instructions	to	dismiss	all	
civil	servants	of	Jewish	origin,	following	orders	of	the	German	occupying	forces.		
Accordingly,	Leiden	University	would	have	to	dismiss	ten	academics	including	
two	professors.	One	of	them	was	a	highly	respected	professor	of	civil	law,	
Eduard	Meijers.		
The	dean	praised	Meijers’	academic	and	human	qualities,	saying:	“It	is	this	
Dutchman,	this	noble	and	true	son	of	our	people,	(...),	this	father	of	students,	this	
scholar,	who	is	being	‘dismissed’	by	the	foreigner	who	now	rules	us	as	an	enemy”.	
Subsequently,	Cleveringa	–	the	law	professor	who	defied	the	law	‐	and	Meijers	
were	arrested	and	deported	to	concentration	camps.	Both,	however,	survived	the	
Second	World	War	(WW2).		
	
Meijers	would	become	the	drafter	of	the	New	Dutch	Civil	Code,	which	after	his	
long	and	meticulous	comparative	research,	would	be	completed	in	the	1990s,	
and	replace	the	old	French‐based	Dutch	Civil	Code.	Cleveringa’s	assessment	of	
Meijers	qualities	as	a	legal	scholar	had	been	correct.	Meanwhile,	the	speech	of	
Cleveringa	himself	became	in	the	Netherlands	known	as	a	symbol	of	courage	and	
justice.	It	befitted	what	has	become	our	dominant	moral	paradigm:		Nazi‐
Germany	as	the	ultimate	evil,	the	Jewish	people	as	its	victim	–	and	the	Dutch,	
those	of	us	who	had	chosen	the	side	of	the	Nazi’s	were	the	‘bad’,	those	who	had	
resisted	the	Nazi’s	were	the	‘good’.		Thus,	Cleveringa,	the	Leiden	law	professor,	
became	a	hero.		
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Such	moral	paradigms,	however,	are	rooted	in	particular	histories,	especially	
histories	of	wars	and	conflicts.i	Cleveringa	represents	a	Dutch	paradigm.	In	
contrast,	for	Egyptian	patriots,	like	Nasser	and	Sadat,	World	War	2	provided	an	
opportunity	to	get	rid	of	the	British	occupation.ii	The	Germans,	fighting	against	
Britain,	were	their	friends	whereas	the	Jews,	who	claimed	land	from	Palestinian	
Arabs,	were	considered	evil.		
So,	many	moral	paradigms	vary	from	place	to	place.	They	keep	communities,	big	
and	small,	together;	they	also	tend	to	exclude	others.	Oftentimes,	law	‐	local,	
national	and	international	law	–	has	been	put	in	place	to	transcend	ethnic	
differences,	regulate	human	behavior	on	an	equal	footing,	and	provide	basic	
rules	for	the	resolution	of	conflicts.	
	
	
POST	WORLD	WAR	2	PARADIGMS	
	
In	the	West,	the	end	of	WW2	brought	important	changes.	When	Nazi	
perpetrators	appeared	before	the	courts	of	justice,	many	of	them	said	to	their	
defense	that	they	had	only	obeyed	the	laws,	and	orders	of	their	superiors.		In	
response,	prosecutors,	judges,	and	legal	scholars	concluded	that	the	Nazi	laws	
and	decisions	had	been	illegitimate	in	that	they	violated	higher	principles	of	
justice	(Radbruch	1946).	Thus	the	rule	of	law	came	to	include	the	paradigm	of	
human	rights.		
	
Also	after	WW2,	global	decolonisation	went	into	full	swing.		In	the	former	
colonies	in	Asia,	the	Middle	East	and	Africa	new	governments	were	fiercely	
nationalist,	authoritarian,	and	mostly	socialist.	Development,	in	the	sense	of	
nation	building	and	socio‐economic	progress,	was	the	dominant	paradigm.	They	
were	eager	to	transform	their	societies	rapidly	in	modern	and	secular	states,	
regarding	sharia	and	custom	as	backward	(Allott	1980).		
	
A	third	change	was	the	rise	of	massive	international	assistance	to	overcome	
socio‐economic	problems.	First,	in	the	1950s	Marshall	Aid	from	the	US	helped	
Western	Europe	to	get	back	on	its	feet.	Subsequently,	in	the	1960s	Europe	and	
North	America	began	to	expand	development	programs	to	the	newly	
independent	states.	An	impressive	international	community	of	institutions	
aiming	for	‘development’	emerged.	Academics	created	new	fields	such	as	
development	studies,	development	economics,	sociology	of	development,	law	
and	development,	and	development	administration.		
	
Meanwhile	the	results	of	most	authoritarian	centralist	governments,	in	terms	of	
economic	development,	were	often	disappointing.	In	the	1970s	the	large	
bureaucracies	were	increasingly	perceived	as	repressive,	inefficient	and	corrupt.	
The	socialist	transformation	was	never	completed,	and	many	people	began	
gradually	to	lose	faith	in	their	regime	and	its	ideology.		
The	international	community,	still	dominated	by	the	West	got	itself	more	
involved,	not	only	for	development,	but	also	for	democracy	and	human	rights.		
At	the	same	time	the	liberalising	state,	however,	allowed	for	the	comeback	of	
powerful	religious	and	traditional	groups	and	their	leaders.	In	Egypt,	President	
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Sadat	had	to	ask	Islamist	groups	for	their	help	in	ousting	a	socialist	political	elite	
and	their	Russian	advisers.		In	Iran	in	1979	Khomeini	staged	his	Islamic	
Revolution	against	the	Shah’s	regime,	and	in	the	same	year	Zia	ul‐Haq	introduced	
Zina	legislation	in	Pakistan.	Islamism	became	a	new	powerful	paradigm.	
	
	
TO	MINYA,	AND	TO	HANYA	
	
In	the	spring	of	1979	I	came	to	Egypt	to	write	a	Master	thesis	in	development	
administration,	about	how	local	government	institutions	interacted	with	
villagers	and	vice	versa.	I	had	studied	law	but	was	now	eager	to	become	a	social	
scientist.	In	Cairo	I	had	joined	my	wife,	Marileen	van	der	Most	van	Spijk,	a	
medical	anthropologist,	who	worked	for	a	Leiden‐based	research	project	called	
Women	and	Development,	funded	by	The	Dutch	ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.	She	
was	to	study	women	and	health	in	Upper	Egypt	(Most	van	Spijk	1982)			
When	we	arrived	at	the	gate	of	the	University	of	Minya	that	spring,	there	were	
armed	soldiers	standing	on	the	surrounding	roofs.	At	the	university	there	were	
great	tensions.	Fundamentalist	students	were	requiring	gendered	segregation	of	
classes,	and	I	remember	that	they	had	written	on	the	walls:	‘Come,	O	Khomeyni’		
(‘Ta’ala,	ya	Khomeini’).	Professor	Abdel	Minam	Shauqi,	our	supervisor,	taught	
sociology	and	social	work.	He	also	was	the	head	of	the	provincial	branch	of	the	
National	Democratic	Party.	The	professor	allocated	students	to	my	wife	and	me,	
to	assist	us	and	to	learn	from	us	‐	perhaps	also	to	keep	an	eye	on	us.		
My	wife’s	student‐assistant	had	an	elder	brother	who	had	been	a	teacher	in	a	
remote	village	bordering	the	Bahr	Yusuf	close	to	the	Eastern	desert.	The	village	
was	called	Hanya.iii	He	introduced	my	wife	to	his	former	colleagues,	teachers	
who	lived	in	the	village.	One	of	them,	Muhammad,	rented	his	house	to	us,	where	
we	would	live	with	some	interruptions	until	the	summer	of	1981.		
	
The	socialist	revolution	had	also	touched	Hanya.	The	estate	of	the	landlord	had	
disappeared,	and	land	had	been	redistributed.		The	village	now	had	a	Primary	
School,	and	an	Agricultural	Cooperative	Society	led	by	an	agronomist.	There	also	
was,	supposedly,	a	traditional	village	government,	led	by	the	umdah	and	two	
shaykh‐al‐balad’s,	each	from	one	of	the	main	families.	The	umdah,	among	other	
tasks,	was	responsible,	to	the	police,	for	law	and	order,	and	commanded	the	
night	watch	(ghufara)	consisting	of	a	few	armed	men.			
In	a	neighboring	village,	at	2	km,	there	was	a	Health	Unit	with	a	medical	doctor,	
nurses,	and	midwives.	There	also	was	the	office	(nuqta)	of	the	Police	Captain	
(zabit),	and	his	men.	At	5	km	there	was	a	principal	village,	Amadi,	with	an	
administrative	center	serving	all	surrounding	villages,	including	the	office	of	the	
Chief	Village	Administrator,	Eng.	Gamal,	the	premises	of	an	elected	Village	
Council,	a	Bank	for	Agricultural	Credit,	and	lastly	the	so‐called	Social	Unit,	
belonging	to	the	ministry	of	Social	Affairs.	These	institutions	were	there	to	foster	
people’s	participation	in	development.	Some	worked	fairly	well,	others	less	so	
(Otto	1993a)iv.	
	
During	the	first	weeks	in	Hanya,	I	tried	to	find	out	who	the	umdah	was,	the	
traditional	village	head.	On	a	morning	I	met	Mahmud,	a	wealthy	farmer,	who	told	
me	that	he	was	the	umdah.	Other	villagers,	however,	told	me	that	Mahmud	had	
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indeed	put	his	candidacy	on	behalf	of	his	family,	the	‘Adil	clan,	but	that	the	leader	
of	the	other	family,	the	Othman	clan,	Hagg	Husayn,	had	lodged	a	complaint	with	
the	Directorate	of	Security,	which	would	ran	the	elections.	Years	ago	Mahmud	
had	crossed	the	desert	to	Libya,	to	escape	from	military	service	and	earn	a	lot	of	
money	in	a	few	years.	Now	this	was	used	against	him.		
Apparently	village	politics	was	dominated	by	a	continuous	struggle	between	two	
rivaling	clan	leaders,	‘Abd	al‐Hakam	of	the	‘Adil	clan	and	Hagg	Husayn	of	the	
Othman	clan,	and	their	associates.	Any	election,	any	effort	to	control	a	
government	institution	from	below,	would	sooner	or	later	turn	into	one	of	their	
political	battles.		It	was	feared	that	especially	elections	for	umdah	in	Hanya	
would	evoke	armed	conflict	and	violence	between	the	two	clans	–	as	had	
happened	in	the	past.	So	the	Security	Directorate	had	postponed	Hanya’s	
elections	for	umdah.	During	our	two	years	in	Hanya,	no	umdah	was	elected.		In	
the	district	and	provincial	capital,	Hanya	was	often	referred	to	as	a	rather	
traditional,	unruly,	if	not	primitive,	village.	To	us,	however,	most	people	were	
generally	welcoming	and	generous.		
	
	
A	BAKERY?	
	
While	trying	to	find	out	whether	the	state	institutions	met	the	needs	of	the	
villagers,	I	also	asked	them	a	question	about	whether	Hanya	was	in	need	of	a	
particular	village	project.		People	expressed	several	demands	for	infrastructure,	
a	bridge,	drinking	water	supply,	and	electricity.	Also	they	asked	for	social	
services,	a	youth	club,	a	health	unit,	an	ambulance.	Some	asked	for	a	new	
mosque.	But	by	far	the	highest	demand	was	for	a	bakery.	In	rural	Upper	Egypt	
bread	was	the	main	staple	food.	The	government	used	to	sell	subsidised	flour	to	
licensed	bakeries,	where	people	could	buy	their	bread	at	low	prices,	one	piaster	
per	loaf	in	1979.		
Now	the	people	from	Hanya	had	to	line	up	before	bakeries	in	other	villages,	
where	often	they	were	not	well	served.	They	would	end	up	with	old	bread,	bread	
of	bad	quality,	too	little	bread,	or	no	bread	at	all.	Self‐help	by	baking	bread	was	
practiced	in	the	village,	but	the	costs	were	much	higher	than	those	of	subsidised	
bread.	Hence,	the	people	of	Hanya	wanted	a	bakery,	more	than	anything	else.	
	
Most	villagers	said	that	the	government	had	failed	to	establish	a	bakery	in	Hanya	
because	they	lacked	a	wastah,	i.e.	a	personal	connection	in	the	government,	such	
as	for	example	a	governor,	a	minister,	an	undersecretary,	or	a	member	of	
parliament.	Other	villages,	which	had	such	wastah,	were	much	better	off,	they	
said.		
People	had	hoped	that	a	certain	rich	villager	would	open	up	a	bakery,	but	rumor	
went	that	he	did	not	want	to	subject	himself	to	the	strict	government	supervision	
of	the	ministry	of	Supply,	with	the	risk	of	severe	penalties.		
Hence,	villagers	began	to	discuss	the	feasibility	of	other	ways	to	get	Hanya	its	
bakery.		
	
The	main	strength	of	the	bakery	project	was	probably	that	it	was	a	home‐	grown	
idea.	But	yet	there	were	problems	with	its	social	feasibility.	The	conflicts	
between	family	clans,	and	the	mutual	distrust	were	such	that	many	doubted	this	
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could	ever	happen.	‘We	cannot	collaborate’,	villagers	used	to	complain,	and	‘we	
don’t	do	things	in	any	organized	way’	(‘mafish	tanzim’).	So,	people	would	depend	
on	wastah,	and	ultimately	on	God.		
	
Did	many	villagers	themselves	already	lack	trust	in	such	project,	the	local	
administration	was	even	less	enthusiastic.	‘Villagers	would	only	quarrel,	and	
make	a	mess	of	it’,	local	officials	said,	‘such	plan	can	only	be	feasible	if	it	would	
become	a	pure	government	project.’	‘After	all’,	the	Chief	Administrator.	Eng.	
Gamal	said,	‘do	the	people	of	Hanya	want	bread,	or	do	they	want	responsibilities	
and	rules?	Let	us	do	it,	we	can	construct	a	very	good	bakery,	a	big	one,	it	will	
provide	employment	to	Hanya’s	people.’		
	
A	recurring	question	was	of	course	who	would	pay	the	investment	costs.	At	the	
Dutch	embassy	in	Cairo	we	were	assured	that	that	problem	could	be	solved.	A	
simple	application	for	a	small	embassy	projectv	could	do	the	job.	And	so	it	
happened.	A	positive	side	effect	was	that	the	ambassador	had	become	interested	
in	the	province	of	Minya	as	a	potential	focus	area;	he	asked	me	for	some	
assistance	to	help	preparing	an	official	visit	to	the	Governor.	The	visit	of	the	
ambassador	solved	at	once	the	project’s	problems	of	access.		The	Governor	was	
willing	to	help	the	project,	and	as	soon	as	he	had	given	his	orders	to	support	the	
village	bakery	in	Hanya,	it	was,	as	one	villager	said	as	if	‘the	world	was	
electrified’	(‘al	dunya	kahrabit’).	Officials	of	the	governorate	and	district	came	
and	went	to	measure	the	land,	make	drawings,	and	help	with	license	
applications.	
	
Did	people	in	Hanya	accept	responsibilities	and	rules,	i.e.	would	village	people	be	
capable	of	self‐management	of	such	project?	Three	of	them,	a	teacher	and	two	
engineers,	who	had	been	involved	in	the	discussions	from	the	outset,	would	
indeed	turn	into	excellent	project	leaders.	They	fulfilled	all	requirements	to	be	
successful	in	this	demanding	context.	They	could	work	well	together.	They	were	
not	involved	in	village	politics;	in	fact	they	did	not	like	the	inter‐clan	conflicts	at	
all	but	because	of	their	respective	kinship	bonds	with	the	two	clan	leaders,	as	a	
group	they	were	considered	to	represent	both	rivaling	clans.	Finally,	they	were	
sufficiently	capable	in	technical,	financial	and	organisational	matters,	and	could	
deal	with	local	bureaucrats.	Their	selection	could	be	a	case	study	in	itself.	In	fact,	
I	had	had	to	promise	to	both	clan	leaders,	separately,	that	I	would	see	to	it	that	
those	three	would	be	appointed,	and	no	one	else.			
	
The	villagers	refused	the	bakery	to	become	a	state	project.	‘Government	officials’,	
people	said,	‘will	suck	up	all	the	profits’.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Dutch	embassy	
would	not	be	willing	to	just	fund	a	private	entrepreneur	from	amongst	the	
villagers.	So,	it	had	to	be	an	intermediate	village	organization.vi	The	Egyptian	law	
provided	for	the	possibility	to	establish	a	Cooperative	Association	for	Village	
Development	(CAVD).	Such	associations	would	fall	under	the	supervision	of	the	
ministry	of	Social	Affairs.	To	cut	a	rather	long	story	short,	Hanya’s	CAVD	was	
established	as	a	legal	entity,	and	its	new	board	members	(see	below)	opened	an	
account	in	the	Village	Bank.			
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To	actually	build	the	bakery,	the	project	needed	land,	labour,	materials,	and	
more	money.		For	each	of	the	resources,	efforts	to	obtain	them	posed	new	
challenges.		‘Abd	al‐Hakam,	for	example,	offered	a	piece	of	land	of	his,	for	free.	
This	gesture	caused	Hagg	Husayn	to	threat	a	complete	withdrawal	of	his	clan.	
For	‘if	the	bakery	will	be	on	‘Abd	al‐Hakam’s	land,	he	will	claim	it	as	his	own	
project’.	So,	a	‘neutral’	piece	of	land	had	to	be	identified,	in	casu	state	land,	which	
brought	its	own	problems.		To	cut	this	story	once	more	the	story	short,	the	three	
project	leaders	worked	and	worked,	they	got	more	and	more	tired	but	persisted,	
often	coming	up	with	creative	solutions,	for	example	in	the	procurement	of	
building	materials	(see	Otto	1993b:	36).		
	
Meanwhile,	all	their	work	was	hardly	noticed	by	fellow	villagers	who	until	the	
construction	actually	would	start	remained	skeptical,	as	usual.		Hearing	some	
talk	about	a	bakery	but	not	seeing	it,	they	said	to	each	other	that	it	must	be	
‘empty	talk’	(‘kalam	fadi’).	Walking	through	the	village,	people	sometimes	began	
to	shout	at	me	‘Where	is	that	bakery,	mr.	Michael?’	(‘fayn	al	makhbaz	,	mr.	
Michael	?’)		
When	the	bakery	was	finally	built	and	well	in	operation,	some	people	began	
making	baseless	accusations	of	the	project	leaders	suggesting	that	they	were	
using	the	project	for	private	gain.	One	villager	in	particular,	Mustafa,	was	hungry	
for	local	power	and	began	to	rally	against	the	project	leaders.	Facing	so	much	
distrust	after	having	made	so	many	sacrifices,	one	of	them	stepped	down,	
disappointed.		
	
Beside	such	struggles	with	fellow	villagers	over	the	years,	the	project	leaders	
sometimes	had	to	deal	with	local	officials	abusing	their	authority.	Initially,	for	
example,	the	health	inspector	first	had	refused	to	give	approval	for	the	
establishment	of	the	CAVD	because	its	‘office’	–	a	room	in	a	mud	house	‐	did	not	
fulfill	the	legal	requirements	of	having	a	flush	toilet,	a	shower,	and	glass	
windows.	At	first	he	was	not	at	all	convinced	by	the	argument	that	no	house	in	
Hanya	had	a	flush	toilet,	a	shower,	or	glass	windows.		
Much	later,	after	years	of	successful	operation,	the	head	of	the	social	unit,	used	
Mustafa’s	ill‐conceived	complaint	as	a	pretext	to	dismiss	the	CAVD’s	board	and	
take	over	its	management	and	bank	account.	When	it	appeared	that	afterwards	
that	under	this	governmental	management	all	the	money	had	disappeared	from	
the	CAVD’s	account,	‘Abd	al‐Hakam	finally	stepped	in,	exercised	his	political	
power,	forced	the	man	to	pay	everything	back	within	24	hours,	and	had	him	
suspended	from	office,	immediately.		
	
There	were	problems	with	the	various	private	entrepreneurs;	the	builders	who	
had	been	contracted	to	build	the	bakery,	and	the	specialists	who	would	make	the	
ovens;	the	bakers,	who	would	lease	the	bakery	from	the	CAVD.	The	builders	
made	a	promising	start	but	then	failed	to	turn	up	for	quite	a	while.	Later,	at	some	
point,	the	baker,	tired	of	people’s	complaints	about	his	bread,	would	leave	the	
bakery	and	close	it,	taking	the	keys	with	him.	Fortunately	the	board	was	able	to	
obtain	a	court	order	to	reopen	the	bakery	and	bring	the	baker	back	to	work.		
	
In	spite	of	all	these	problems	and	struggles,	the	bakery	survived	and	provided	
Hanya’s	people	with	bread.	However,	when	a	second	project	leader	also	gave	up	
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and	stepped	down,	the	legal	entity	of	the	CAVD	was	finally	dissolved	by	the	
ministry	of	Social	Affairs.	The	bakery	was	then	brought	under	Hanya’s	pre‐
existing	Cooperative	Association	for	Islamic	Welfare.		
	
Case	studies	are	used	in	social	sciences	to	provide	in‐depth	insights.	In	order	to	
generalize	on	the	basis	of	this	study	of	a	village	bakery	in	the	legal	form	of	a	
CAVD,	one	would	have	to	ask	‘Of	what	is	this	a	case?’	(Lund	2014)	At	the	time	in	
1979	I	looked	at	it	primarily	as	a	case	study	of	a	participatory	rural	development	
project.	Now,	given	my	present	academic	work,	I	would	look	more	closely	at	its	
socio‐legal	dimension,	as	a	case	study	of	what	local	people	do	with	legal	rules.	
Thirdly,	I	could	also	look	at	it	as	a	case	of	an	abandoned	type	of	international	
assistance	from	the	Netherlands	to	Egypt.	Here	are	some	reflections	on	each	of	
these	three	cases.	
	
	
REFLECTIONS	ON	A	CASE	OF	PARTICIPATORY	RURAL	DEVELOPMENT	
		
Before	the	project	came	about,	Hanya’s	collective	need	of	a	bakery	could	not	be	
met	by	the	government,	neither	by	the	private	sector,	nor	by	any	community	
based	voluntary	group.	On	the	side	of	the	village	community,	there	was	the	
problem	of	conflicts	between	family	clans,	i.e.	of	exclusion	at	a	local	level.	
Whereas,	among	close	family	members	and	friends,	people	were	usually	
generous,	loyal	and	trustful,	at	village	level	there	was	lots	of	mutual	distrust,	
constant	envy,	and	destructive	gossip.		
‘Abd	al‐Hakam	and	Hagg	Husayn	were	too	busy	with	managing	their	own	clan	
and	politicking	against	the	other,	to	work	towards	community	development	for	
the	village	as	a	whole.	So	small‐scale	ethnic	conflict	and	mutual	exclusion	
blocked	development.		
	
This	is	not	to	say	that	the	villagers	could	not	organise.	But	their	planning	and	
organization,	their	responsibilities	addressed	mostly	their	private	spheres.	They	
were	able	farmers,	some	of	them	were	big	traders.		If	someone	died,	the	message	
would	efficiently	be	conveyed	to	all	who	needed	to	know,	and	out	of	the	blue	
there	would	be	a	huge	number	of	guests,	chairs,	of	food,	and	drinks,	an	enormous	
tent.		
Or,	when	a	fire	erupted	in	the	village	within	seconds,	young	men	were	on	simple	
ladders,	working	efficiently	together,	putting	buckets	of	sand	or	water	to	
extinguish	the	fire.	An	hour	later,	long	after	the	work	was	done,	we	would	hear	
the	bell	of	the	fire	brigade’s	car,	arriving	from	the	district	capital.		People	would	
smile	and	say	‘such	is	the	government’	(‘al‐hukuma	kida’)	–	and	offer	the	driver	
food	and	cigarettes.				
	
In	1979	the	people	of	Hanya	generally	saw	the	government	as	legitimate.	Yes,	it	
exercised	strict	control	but	it	was	less	repressive	than	it	had	been	under	Nasser’s	
rule.	And	through	the	Agricultural	Cooperative	Society	it	still	provided	peasants	
with	cheap	seeds	and	fertilizer.	There	was	free	irrigation	water,	cheap	public	
transport,	and	social	services.	Nasser’s	land	reform	still	remained	one	of	the	very	
few	examples	around	the	world	of	a	successful	redistribution,	and	Sadat	had	
continued	this	policy.		
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Some	of	the	local	level	officials	were	honest	and	responsive,	however,	others	
were	weak	and	indifferent,	meeting	people’s	requests	with	their	trusted	I‐B‐M	
motto	of	Insya’Allah	(God	willing),	Bukra	(tomorrow),	Ma’alaysh	(let	it	be).		
The	head	of	the	Social	Unit,	an	official	who	was	formally	in	a	key	position	to	
support	such	project,	had	used	his	legal	powers	to	obstruct	the	bakery	project	
for	his	own	private	gain.			
Villagers	frequently	had	such	bad	experiences	with	state	officials.	Hence,	they	
preferred	to	simply	avoid	the	government	where	possible	and	evade	its	efforts	to	
regulate.		
	
Hence	it	was	quite	a	step	for	the	project	leaders	to	start	to	accessing	the	legal‐
institutional	framework,	and	it	proved	indeed	to	be	cumbersome	at	times.	‘You	
cannot	let	the	documents	travel	alone’,	they	taught	me,	‘	you	always	have	to	be	
with	the	paper	all	the	time	so	that	when	an	official	must	do	something,	you	are	
with	the	paper	at	his	desk’.		During	this	action	research	I	was,	as	a	foreigner	with	
useful	contacts,	in	a	way	just	the	wastah	Hanya	had	missed.	We	were	lucky	to	
find	in	the	Dutch	embassy	an	accessible	and	flexible	donor,	ready	to	sponsor	
small	projects.		
The	ambassador	during	his	visit	to	the	governorate	of	Minya	played	his	role	as	a	
super‐wastah	perfectly.	He	came	to	the	village	to	offer	the	donation,	delivered	a	
speech	as	a	promoter	of	participatory	development,	attaching	some	sensible	
conditionalities	to	the	donation,	and	finally	acted	as	local	peace‐builder	bringing	
a	sense	of	unity	to	the	rivaling	family	clans.		
	
		
REFLECTIONS	ON	THE	BAKERY	AS	A	SOCIO‐LEGAL	CASE	
	
The	socio‐legal	approach	does	not	look	at	law	as	a	set	of	rules	but	rather	at	what	
people	do	with	rules.	Throughout	the	bakery	case	Egyptian	law	was	far	from	self‐
propelling.	If	people	of	the	village	community	needed	the	law,	it	had	to	be	put	in	
motion	for	them,	with	outside	efforts.	But	local	officials	in	charge	of	participatory	
rural	development	were	not	ready	to	deal	with	the	legal	dimensions	of,	say,	
establishing	a	CAVD.	When	Hagg	Husayn	heard	that	the	Chief	Village	
Administrator	had	told	me	‘What	do	the	people	want,	bread,	or	rules	and	
responsibilities,	he	said	to	me:	‘You	see,	mr.	Michael,	a	Chief	Village	
Administrator	should	be	a	sociologist,	who	understands	people,	or	a	lawyer,	who	
understands	the	rules.	But	he	is	an	agricultural	engineer.	And	you	know,	an	
agricultural	engineer	in	Egypt	is	nothing	but	a	peasant	dressed	in	a	suit.’		
	
When	in	the	nineties	I	came	to	see	Hagg	Husayn	again,	he	lived	in	a	new	house,	
far	outside	the	village	center,	in	the	middle	of	his	fields.	I	asked	him	how	he	had	
obtained	permission	to	build	here,	as	it	seemed	a	blatant	violation	of	the	land	use	
law.	‘You	know	what	the	land	use	law	is	worth	in	this	country,	Mr.	Michael.	200	
pounds.	I	went	to	Cairo,	with	a	relative	who	knew	someone	there,	and	that	is	
what	was	paid.’	So,	the	law	is	not	self‐propelling.	From	the	foot	of	the	pyramids,	
people	work	their	ways	upwards	to	actually	disempower	the	law	if	that	suits	
their	interest.	Even	though	the	government	does	make	efforts	to	enforce	the	law,	
making	it	work	in	such	circumstances	requires	a	constant	struggle.	
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The	bakery	case	also	taught	me	that	parts	of	Egypt’s	national	law	did	not	work	
locally.	For	the	CAVD	to	have	a	Board,	the	law	prescribed	that	the	CAVD’s	
General	Assembly	(all	members)	shall	elect	the	members	of	the	board.	But	every	
sensible	person	in	the	village	advised	to	avoid	both	the	prescribed	registration	of	
CAVD	members	and	the	election	of	a	board.	This	would	only	cause	lots	of	trouble	
and	conflict,	they	said.	So,	a	report	was	made	of	a	meeting	that	was	never	held,	
and	a	report	provided	evidence	of	a	voting	process	that	never	took	place;	this	
was	done	in	order	to	avoid	turmoil	and	save	the	project.	In	sum,	for	the	benefit	of	
development	a	solution	had	to	be	found	around	the	law,	and	this	what	something	
the	villagers	were	good	at.		
	
According	to	what	Ehrlich	would	have	called	‘the	living	law’	of	the	village,	
villagers	leading	such	project	would	have	to	comply	with	the	directives	of	either	
‘Abd	al‐Hakam	or	Hagg	Husayn.	Hence	any	major	project	decision,	any	step	
required	to	comply	with	state	law	and	official	orders,	had	to	be	explained	to	
them	and	submitted	for	their	informal	approval.		Thus	some	traditional	shuttle	
diplomacy	had	to	be	conducted	to	get	this	divided	community	behind	the	project.		
	
As	was	shown	above,	lower	officials	often	tended	to	slow	down	the	law’s	
implementation	by	sticking	to	some	provision,	some	unfulfilled	condition.	But	
after	high	level	support	of	the	governor	was	ensured,	with	the	help	of	the	
ambassador,	officials	worked	incredibly	fast	and	efficient:	the	world	had	indeed	
been	electrified.		
When	a	baker	had	closed	the	bakery	in	breach	of	his	contract,	the	court	could	be	
accessed	to	provide	an	effective	remedy.	So,	this	part	of	the	legal	system	worked	
effectively	and	served	the	project	well.		
	
Whereas	law	is	supposed	to	contribute	to	justice,	the	impact	of	law	much	
depends	on	what	people	do	with	its	rules.	Over	the	last	decade	the	widespread	
abuse	of	legal	rules	by	government	officials	has	undoubtedly	contributed	to	the	
popular	support	for	the	Muslim	Brotherhood.	Their	call	for	restoring	Islamic	
justice,	however,	has	left	key	questions	open.	Would	it	be	egalitarian	justice,	
libertarian,	or	utilitarian	justice?	Would	their	interpretation	of	God’s	law	be	
puritan	or	moderate?		
	
	
REFLECTIONS	ON	A	CASE	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ASSISTANCE	
	
From	the	perspective	of	Hanya’s	villagers,	small	was	beautiful	in	international	
aid.	The	small	and	flexible	embassy	project	fund	was	the	catalyst	they	needed	to	
get	into	action.	The	success	of	the	project	did	create	a	lot	of	goodwill,	in	the	
village	and	wide	surroundings.	Many	years	later,	even	generations	later,	people	
still	remembered	how	the	Dutch	helped	people	in	need.	It	may	be	hard,	though,	
to	measure	such	type	of	impact	by	conventional	project	monitoring	and	
evaluation	tools.		
	
Thirty	years	ago	I	moved	from	the	study	of	rural	development	administration	in	
Egypt	to	the	study	of	law	and	legal	reform	in	Indonesia.	One	of	the	lessons	I	had	
learnt	from	development	administration,	was	that	a	development	project	in	
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order	to	be	successful	should	be	a	two‐way	learning	process	(Korten	1982).	If	so	
much	inside	knowledge	and	hard	efforts	were	required	to	carry	out	a	project	as	
simple	as	a	village	bakery,	what	about	changing	a	legal	system,	in	which	complex	
laws,	legal	institutions	and	processes	are	all	interdependent.		
So,	at	Leiden	University	we	began	to	make	in‐depth	case	studies	of	Indonesian	
law,	as	it	was	made,	applied,	and	taught	in	legislatures,	courts,	bureaucracies,	
and	law	schools.	Through	the	research	and	from	our	Indonesian	research	
partners	we	learned	much	about	constraints	and	opportunities	for	legal	change,	
and	the	potential	of	certain	change	agents.	The	research	informed	a	major	Dutch	
aid	program	for	legal	development	that	we	helped	carrying	out	from	1985	to	
1992.	This	program	was	followed	by	other	legal	development	programs,	from	
Canada,	the	USA,	Australia	and	other	donors.		They	all	helped	to	train	a	
generation	of	jurists,	many	of	whom	would	be	called	to	important	positions	after	
Suharto’s	government	had	come	to	an	end	in	1998.		
	
Over	the	last	20	years,	international	rule‐of‐law	and	human	rights	programs	
have	become	part	of	a	large	scale	‘industry’.	In	foreign	aid	the	emphasis	has	
gradually	shifted	from	projects	aimed	at	basic	developmental	needs	to	projects	
in	support	of	the	rule	of	law,	of	human	rights,	and	of	the	private	sector.		
Around	the	world	much	donor	money,	in	fact	hundreds	of	millions	of	US	dollar	
annually,	is	spent	to	strengthen	countries’	legal	systems.	Many	consultants	are	
hired	to	run	this	‘business’	but	serious	doubts	remain	whether	such	large	scale	
rule	of	law	support	enhances	access	to	justice	for	the	ordinary	men	and	women,	
in	spite	of	the	efforts	made	to	evaluate	and	to	measure	numbers	of	people	
trained	and	manuals	distributed.					
	
Furthermore,	Makau	Mutua	has	argued	that	over	the	last	decades	the	discourse	
on	human	rights	‐	a	centerpiece	of	the	rule	of	law	‐	in	the	context	of	international	
relations,	has	gradually	lost	its	appeal	in	recipient	countries.	The	West,	he	says,	is	
seen	as	using	double	standards,	being	self‐centered,	and	simplifying	the	
dilemmas	and	difficulties	of	recipient	countries.	I	do	agree	with	this	part	of	the	
argument	but	at	the	same	time	our	research	in	several	developing	countries	
shows	that	on	the	ground	human	rights	are	increasingly	valued	and	applied	as	
means	of	legal	empowerment.		
	
In	Libya,	after	the	fall	of	Gaddafi,	the	international	donor	community	pledged	
large	sums	to	restore	‘the	rule	of	law’	in	Libya.	We,	at	Leiden	University,	were	
lucky	to	find	a	few	good	partners	at	the	University	of	Benghazi,	in	order	to	
conduct	collaborative	research	the	result	of	which	was	helpful	for	those	donors	
who	want	to	be	informed.	Such	academic	collaboration	seems	to	be	cheaper,	
more	sustainable	and	perhaps	even	more	promising	than	the	larger	projects	of	
the	big	entrepreneurs	in	the	Rule	of	Law	industry,	who	come	and	go.		
No	big	programs	are	per	se	needed	for	vital	legal	progress.	For	a	reliable	and	
convincing	interpretation	of	the	recent	6	November	ruling	in	which	Libya’s	
Supreme	Court	deemed	the	Tobruk	parliament	and	the	Al‐Thinni	government	
illegal,	surprising	and	silencing	the	international	community,	one	excellent	and	
trusted	Libyan	legal	scholar	is	sufficient.	Instead	of	focusing	mainly	on	large	
scale	training,	small	scale	collaborative	socio‐legal	research	could	and	should	in	
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my	view	become	a	key	instrument	of	international	assistance	in	legal	
development.		
	
	
BACK	TO	EGYPT	TODAY	
	
I	have	been	away	from	Egypt	for	twenty	years,	so	I	feel	a	bit	like	a	stranger.	But	
reading	short	stories	by	Khaled	al	Khamissi,	in	his	recent	book	simply	entitled	
‘Taxi’	helped	me	to	reconnect.		I	recognized	a	strong	continuity	of	the	Egyptian	
way	of	life.	It	seems	that	below	the	surface	of	major	changes,	much	of	the	
Egyptian	life	and	soul	have	remained	the	same:	the	struggle	for	survival,	the	
sense	of	humor,	the	joy	and	pressures	of	family	life,	the	distrust	of	politics	and	
foreigners,	the	deep	belief	in	Allah,	the	bribe‐taking	policemen,	the	frustrations	
in	government	offices,	people’s	generosity	and	politeness:	it	is	all	there,	still.		
	
Of	course	there	have	been	major	changes	as	well.	It	is	said	that	the	country	is	
appearing	more	Islamic	than	when	we	left	in	1981.	I	am	not	sure	what	that	
means.	People	in	Hanya	were	deeply	religious	but	it	seemed	at	that	time	that	
hardly	anyone	in	the	village	sympathized	with	the	Muslim	brothers.	Observers	
wrote	that	many	of	Upper	Egypt’s	villagers	voted	for	Mursi,	disappointed	as	they	
were	in	Mubarak’s	regime.	But	whether	such	support	will	endure,	is	unclear.	
	
All	over	the	world	good	governance	has	become	complicated,	and	in	Muslim	
countries	the	complexity	has	an	extra	dimension	due	to	claims	made	puritan	and	
radical	Islamists.		
When	state‐sponsored	and	foreign‐supported	paradigms	of	development,	aid,	
good	governance,	and	justice	lose	their	credibility,	alternative	paradigms	may	
gain	support.	Against	this	background	the	key	challenge	for	all	Muslim	
governments	and	their	international	partners	remains	essentially	to	work	
towards	inclusive	socio‐economic	development,	honest	governance,	social	
justice,	and	a	strong	criminal	justice	apparatus.	Besides,	there	remains	a	need	for	
convincing	moral	paradigms	about	the	maslaha,	the	public	interest,	supported	by	
homegrown,	moderate,	theological	and	moral	discourses.		
	
	
CLEVERINGA’S	MESSAGE	
	
Ladies	and	gentlemen,	in	2002	the	Cleveringa	memorial	lecture	in	Leiden	was	
held	by	the	then	mayor	of	Amsterdam,	Job	Cohen,	a	former	law	professor,	and	
like	Meijers,	of	Jewish	descent.	It	was	a	year	after	9/11,	and	only	months	after	
the	assassination	of	maverick	politician	Pim	Fortuyn,	who	had	revived	ethnic	
politics	in	the	Netherlands,	with	a	strong	anti‐Islam	sentiment,	putting	hundreds	
of	thousands	of	mainly	Turkish	and	Morrocan	immigrant	families	in	an	
unfortunate	position.		
Mayor	Cohen	first	revealed	that	his	mother	as	a	student	had	been	among	
Cleveringa’s	audience.	She	related	that	it	had	felt	like	‘	balm	for	her	soul’	and	that	
she	strongly	had	the	feeling	of	being	included,	instead	of	excluded.	Mayor	Cohen	
noted	in	his	speech	that	after	9/11	many	Dutch	muslims	felt	excluded	and	
alienated.	Suddenly,	the	society	had	become	divided,	between	‘us’	and	‘	them’.	
	 12
Hence,	he	argued	for	the	need	of	inclusive	policies	and	full	participation	of	all	
citizens.	Today,	much	still	remains	to	be	done.	Teaching	Arabic	at	this	institute,	
here	in	Cairo,	to	Dutch	and	Belgian	students,	seems	to	be	at	least	a	useful	
contribution.			
	
In	sum,	ladies	and	gentlemen,	Cleveringa’s	message	of	inclusion,	though	rooted	
in	Dutch	history,	is	a	universal	message	about	fairness,	about	justice.	Exclusion	
and	repression	tend	to	backfire,	leading	to	resistance	and	conflict,	blocking	
national	unity	and	socio‐economic	progress.		
Again	and	again,	the	challenge	for	mankind	is	to	overcome	these	primordial,	
ethnic	differences	and	conflicts–	whether	at	the	levels	of	family,	clan,	village,	
country,	or	globally	–,	and	find	credible	paradigms	which	help	people	to	willingly	
share	responsibilities,	to	shape	reasonable	rules	and	apply	them	reasonably.		
As	for	the	bakery	case,	may	there	be	bread	for	everyone	in	Hanya	village,	and	in	
the	global	village,	may	the	ground	of	this	country	be	often	electrified	in	the	way	it	
was	in	this	case,	may	the	‘Abd	al‐Hakam’s	and	the	Hagg	Husayn’s	of	this	world	
live	and	let	live	in	peace,	and	may	the	Dutch‐Flemish	Institute	in	Cairo	continue	
its	mission	for	many	years	to	come.		
	
Thank	you	for	your	attention.	
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Notes	
																																																								
i	Mayor	Eberhard	van	der	Laan	of	Amsterdam	made	this	point	in	a	2014	lecture.		
ii	Anwar	Sadat’s	(1978:	41‐55)	autobiography	is	clear	on	this	point.		
iii	The	name	of	the	village	and	the	names	of	all	persons	mentioned	in	this	lecture	
are	not	their	genuine	names.	I	changed	them	for	the	sake	of	people’s	privacy.	The	
facts	mentioned,	however,	are	real.	The	case	study	was	elaborated	in	my	PhD	
thesis	(Otto	1987)	and	in	a	research	report	(Otto	1993b);	the	latter	included	
events	that	took	place	between	1981	and	1992.	
iv	The	government	institutions	were	analysed	in	my	thesis	(Otto	1987).	A	
summary	of	the	findings	was	published	as	a	book	chapter	(Otto	1993a).	
v	At	the	time	Dutch	embassies	in	developing	countries	used	to	manage	a	program	
of	small	embassy	projects	(Kleine	Ambassade	Projecten,	or	KAP).			
vi	In	development	administration	many	scholars	addressed	the	question	as	to	
what	should	be	the	prime	mover	of	development,	the	state,	the	market,	or	local	
voluntary	associations.	In	the	early	1990s	Esman	noted	the	emergence	of	a	
paradigmatic	consensus.	In	the	context	of	this	bakery	project	the	solution	
consisted	indeed	of	an	interesting	mix	of	the	three.	On	‘intermediacy’	see	also	
Landau	(1980).		 				
